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ARTICLE
EMPOWERMENT OR ESTRANGEMENT?: LIBERAL
FEMINISM'S VISIONS OF THE "PROGRESS" OF MUSLIM
WOMEN
By: Cyra Akila Choudhury*

[I]sn 't it imperative and a little bit obvious that when we speak
of Afghan women and their rights, we must listen carefully to
what they themselves have to say about it? As the admirable
struggles of women of color, particularlyin the Global South,
come to the knowledge of the West, we must remind ourselves
of the validity of their views and hopes, over our perceptions of
what they should say and do, how they should dress and
whether or not their oppression stems from being able to have
an orgasm.

T

he last decade and a half has seen a burgeoning of transnational
activism on behalf of women in the global South. With the
continuing wars on terror and in Iraq, Muslim women's oppression
and the role of Islam in that oppression remain in the limelight.
Academically, it has become a subject of much interest and a recurrent
theme in the discourse has been how to "help" Muslim women
progress towards greater liberty and rights. The debate has included
calls for "multiculturalism" and tolerance for Muslims in the West, for
monetary aid, and also for diplomatic and sometimes armed
intervention. Though the concern may be well-intentioned, there is an
expectation that Muslims, particularly women, will eventually value
the same rights and social orderings as those of their benefactors in the
West. Yet when Muslim women consistently articulate a different
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University. This article has benefited
greatly from the rich conversations with and insights of Aya Gruber and Lama Abu-Odeh as
well as the continuing support of Robin West. Special thanks are due to the organizers and
participants of the "Can You Hear Us Now" conference at the University of Baltimore, held
on March 7, 2008.
1 Sonia Kolhatkar, "Saving" Afghan Women in ZNET, May 09, 2002, available at
http://www.rawa.org/znet.htm. To extend this quote, I would also add "having an orgasm,
wearing hijab or not being able to drive a car," which also seem to preoccupy Western
feminists.
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vision for themselves, it is a source of concern and puzzlement that
can only be resolved through judgments about the "progress" of their
consciousness, education, and/or experience relative to "Western"
women. This article seeks to challenge those judgments. To do so, I
examine the liberal theoretical underpinnings of these scholarly and
activist projects to reveal how they advance a particular idea of human
flourishing that seeks to ultimately "reform" or extinguish those life
forms (including traditional Islam) that do not comport with it.
In the first section of the article, I examine how liberalism's
justification for colonialism has become sublimated in liberal (legal)
feminism, which subconsciously continues traditional liberal political
theory's judgments about the "East." I suggest that most liberal
feminists also have a specific idea of women's flourishing that
prevents it from fully comprehending Muslim women who choose to
adhere to Islam, which is, in their view, a hopelessly patriarchal and
gender oppressive religion. 2 Liberal notions of flourishing require
progress towards a liberal society. As such, "reform" is used to further
this vision. I argue that liberal feminism also shares this "narrative
2
Some definitions are required at this stage: when I refer to liberal feminist theorists, I
am referring primarily to second-wave feminists who share liberalism's political agenda of
individual autonomy, equal rights, and a commitment to liberal democracy as well as a
particular view of human flourishing and progress that I discuss in the paper. To some extent,
the definition is broad enough to capture elements of the third-wave but for the most part, I am
speaking of the second-wave. Further, I am not constraining this definition to women located
in the "West" but to all women who share this particular agenda. Second, "Muslim women"
is a rather broad category and the use of it could be taken as a reduction or essentialism born
of identity politics. However, I use the term more for simplicity than out of a belief that all
Muslim women share some essential characteristic. In my discussion of Muslim women's
groups, I include secularist groups like Revolutionary Afghan Women's Association
("RAWA") as well as the religious pietist women because what I am trying to get at is a world
view that exists outside of Liberalism. Even though secularism itself is a product of Liberal
thought, Muslim women's secularist groups live in contexts where secularism coexists and is
shaped by culture and religion in ways that, to some extent, place them outside of Liberalism.
Finally, when I refer to International Human Rights (IHR), I am referring to the universal
norms that underlie IHR law and the pressure to reform local norms to reflect them. However,
I do not mean to suggest that there is no overlap or that the human rights conventions do not
reflect the aims of women in the third world. What I will suggest is that what is understood
by inequality or discrimination, the rights that are struggled for are heavily mediated by local
considerations including culture and religion, neither of which are essential or monolithic. I
would suggest that because culture is not monolithic, claims that certain cultures clash with
human rights because of some essential incompatibility ought to be examined very critically.
I should also make clear that I do not subscribe to the notion of a discreet East/West or
North/South. It is clear that the West contains a large population that could be considered
"Eastern" and that the global South is no longer "people over there" but often live side by side
with their affluent "Northern" neighbors in urban ghettos and banlieues. As such my
references to third-world women, women of the global South and women in the East should
be read not geographically but politically and economically.
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progress" that reduces non-liberal societies to "developing" and,
consequently, global southern women to victims.
Yet, many women in the global South reject this characterization of
their existence. In the second part of the article, I offer some examples
of Muslim women's visions of flourishing that show both overlap with
liberal values and, more importantly, divergence. I propose that
Muslim women's adherence to religion must be accepted as legitimate
expressions of flourishing even if we, as Western feminists, are
skeptical about the freedom of their choice. I urge feminists who have
continued to be extremely incredulous about Muslim women's choices
to live according to Islam, to re-evaluate
and see these women as
3
lives.
own
their
in
exerting power
Unfortunately, such reconsideration is complicated by the fact that
there are strategic benefits to ignoring Muslim women's agency. Both
women's organizations in the Muslim world and Western organizations
capitalize on women's suffering, the former to gain support from
resource-rich first world organizations and the latter to mobilize their
constituents. Yet the costs of such strategic representations remained
under-examined. In the third part of the article, I use the interaction of
the Revolutionary Afghan Women's Association ("RAWA") and the
Feminist Majority Foundation ("FMF") to highlight how
representations of powerlessness of Muslim women and the
reinforcement of liberal expectations about Muslim women resulted in
the estrangement between these two organizations.
Finally, the article considers some of the side-effects of liberal
feminist transnational work: the alliances with the state as an apparatus
to pressure the global South to progress and the alliance with
international law and calls for intervention in the south on behalf of
women. I argue that liberal second-wave feminists and human rights
hawk feminists should carefully consider how seemingly benign
armed intervention can be linked with and traced from the liberal
"imperative to progress" and the therapeutic violence of colonial
interventions.
Given that liberal theory has justified colonial
subordination through a discourse of progress, feminism ought to be
3
Indeed, we ought to be skeptical about the freedom of our own choices despite the fact
that we "feel" free. Skepticism about Muslim women's choices, particularly when they
choose modes of being that seem to constrain freedom, prevents us from a relativist extreme
that makes all choices of equal value. On the other hand, skepticism about our own choices
and modes of being prevents us from mistaking our position as objective or somehow
inherently superior. Resolving the dilemma between agency and victimization is no easy task,
and this article does not explore it in depth. See Robin West, Law's Nobility, 17 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 385, 392 (2005).
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wary of any liberal legal system that seeks to perpetuate that
subordination. For most women in the South, liberation through
interventions that have adverse impacts on their social arrangements
and their families may not be worth the price.
I. LIBERAL CONTINUITIES: THE LIBERALISM OF FEMINIST
THOUGHT AND THE NARRATIVE OF PROGRESS
The purpose of this section of the article is not simply to claim that
imperial feminism is, in a tautology, colonial. Rather, it is to examine
why liberal feminisms, even those that claim to be anti-imperial, might
in reality be more imperial than they admit. I argue that historically
liberalism has justified the subordination of those whose lives and
values, social arrangements and institutions were utterly alien. Liberal
feminism, which can claim at least a partial ancestry from theorists
like Mill and Locke, therefore, are prone to the same critique as
liberalism when it comes to alien women. The result is a theory that in
some measure supports the "progress" of these other "developing"
women towards values and arrangements that reflect liberal society.
First, it is worthwhile to consider liberalism's relationship to
empire. In his work, Liberalism and Empire, Uday Singh Mehta raises
the question: What happened when a political thought, selfconsciously universal in its scope, was confronted with the
unfamiliarity of the life forms in the British Empire? 4 A summary
answer to this question, at the risk of oversimplifying a complex
historical interaction and process, is that liberalism understood the
unfamiliar as the underdeveloped or the infantile. Putting all the
cultures on a single evolutionary trajectory, liberalism in its colonial
period understood the colonized to be progressing towards civilization
defined by Europe. One responsibility of the conscientious imperialist
then was to advance that progress, although it seems unlikely that any
of the colonized societies would ever progress enough to reach the
point of civilization that would allow them self-rule. In any event,
while the telos was a liberal society with the necessary social
arrangements, the technique that was then used to achieve it was both
social and legal reform. In India, during British rule, this lead to the
codification of the laws and to the import of British liberal legal norms
and laws to replace the domestic systems that were in effect. British

4

See UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE:

BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT 82-87, 90-94 (1999).
See id.
5

A

STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
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law was more efficient and more just in the eyes of the colonial
administrators while native laws were hopelessly arbitrary and
confusing. Certainly the view was that the imported laws were more
progressive for many minorities and women despite the fact that these
improvements were resisted by a large number of Indians.6 As Mehta
notes:
History and progress are an unremitting preoccupation of nineteenthcentury British Liberalism. Yet the political vision that governed that
liberalism was, as it were, already firmly universal. Philosophically there is
a dilemma here. Either the validity of that political vision could not be
swayed by historical considerations or the liberal agenda was in some
central way directed at the "reform" and modification of the various
histories it encountered, so as to make them conform to the universalistic
vision. Because if the particularities and trajectories of the histories and
lives to which the empire exposed liberals did not somehow already align
themselves with that vision, then either that vision had to be acknowledged
as limited in its reach or those recalcitrant and deviant histories had to be
realigned to comport with it. Liberals consistently opted for the latter-that
is to say, "reform" was indeed central to the liberal agenda and mind-set.
To that end they deployed a particular conception of what really constituted
7
history along with a particular conception of what counted as progress.

To what extent then is this also the account of liberal feminism with
regard to women in the global South? Are the liberal women's rights
activists that seek to rearrange the "deviant histories" of Asian,
African and Islamic peoples engaged in the same project as the liberal
scholars who provided the philosophical justification for colonial
empires? After all, is not the end to which liberal feminism aspires a
society that resembles and has all the hallmarks of their own societies?
Insofar as liberal feminists desire other women to have a society that
affords women equal rights (that we now understand go beyond formal
equality), that allow women equal opportunities, and representation in
government, and that free them from gender violence. These are
laudable goals that are imagined to be shared by women all over the
world.8 But in order for that goal to be reached, progress must be
made by reconfiguring not just the relationship between men and
women and between women and the state but to reform culture or
religion in a way that comports with liberal notions of history and
progress. For most liberal feminists whose view of women's lives in
See generally Cyra Akila Choudhury, (Mis)AppropriatedLiberty: Identity, Gender
6
Justice, and Muslim PersonalLaw Reform in India, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2008).

7

Mehta, supranote 4, at 77.

8

See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? (Joshua

Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1999).
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the global South as thoroughly interwoven with violence justified by
culture, this is an unmitigated good. Judged from the Archimedean
point of liberal feminism, how can change towards liberalism be
anything but good when women are merely subjects of a patriarchal
religion or culture and live in abject misery? The following quote
illustrates the point:
It is by no means clear, then from a feminist point of view, that minority
group rights are part of the solution. They may well exacerbate the
problem. In the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in the context of
a less patriarchal majority culture, no argument can be made on the basis of
self-respect or freedom that the female members of the culture have a clear
interest in its preservation. Indeed, they might be much better off ifthe
culture into which they were born were either to become extinct... or,
preferably, to be encouragedto alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of

women-at
least to the degree to which this value is upheld in the majority
9
culture.

Although the author's sentiment is expressed in the context of
minority cultures in a liberal majority society, the assimilationist view
and indeed the very explicit comfort with the alteration or extinction
of another culture, that in her judgment does not measure up, is an
example of the kind of imperative to progress Mehta interrogates.
Here the yardstick that is used to judge the relative value of "other"
cultures is both liberal and feminist.
Another example of liberal feminism's "imperative to progress" is
the same author's response to the assertion that the veil does not have
a singular significance for Muslim women: "[S]urely to be unable to
go out and practice one's profession without being enshrouded from
head to toe is not, on the whole, an empowering situation in which to
live, unless it is a temporary transition to greaterfreedom."' In one
sentence, she makes explicit liberalism's judgments and the progress it
seeks. Living without the veil is greater freedom. A veiled woman is
by the very fact that she wears a veil oppressed. In order to be free,
the veiled woman must progress out of the veil. Such reductionism
9
Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added).
10 Id. at 124 (emphasis added). I am certain that the charge that my critique encourages
"cultural relativism" will be leveled as a defense of Liberalism. I have two thoughts about
this. First, that cultural relativism as a reason not to consider the internal views of those who
differ presupposes that "our" view is fixed and correct. If all views are co-evolving and no
culture is essential, then the charge of relativism seems to lose traction. Second, if we take
cultures to be inessential and evolving as well as interacting with other cultures, then we can
find internal critiques and dissents that are grounds for coalitions in an ever-shrinking world
without the need to hegemonically export liberal norms under the guise of universal truth
through the vehicle of international law because we consider them to be superior--even if and
when we do consider them to be superior.
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imagines veiled Muslim women as being nothing more than victims of
their circumstances. For the author, it seems impossible that veiling
could have a religious significance other than sexual control or that it
could be "chosen."
II. OUTSIDE LIBERAL PROGRESS: MUSLIM WOMEN'S
DESIRES
In the post 9/11 United States, images of oppressed Muslim women
are a commonplace. It would not be overstating it to say that Muslim
women are considered some of the most oppressed women in the
world by most Americans. Typically, references to the veil, female
circumcision, honor killings, gang rape, and restrictions on movement
all bear the hallmarks of a singular "Islamic culture." Religion rather
than liberating women, or helping them actualize themselves, is used
to justify such subordination and compounds their oppression at the
hands of Muslim men. In general, neither culture nor religion is seen
as internally heterogeneous, contested and fluid."1 Interestingly, this
view of religion (and culture) as being largely unchanging is shared by
both highly traditional Muslims who argue that no part of Islamic law
is contingent on interpretation and location as well as traditional
liberal feminists who construe religions as unchangingly patriarchal both views essentialize some part of religion to make their arguments
for or against it. 12
In her article, Piercing the Veil, Madhavi Sunder argues the
problem with this construction of religion is not with religion itself but
with liberalism, which places religion in the private sphere and prefers
to leave it alone rather than engaging it as have many Muslims.1 3 By
not engaging in the internal debates about religion in liberal societies
and ignoring the debates in non-liberal societies, liberals maintain the
fiction that the interiority of religion is a fixed landscape. By not
sufficiently accounting for the changes in religion that would become
apparent through such engagement and by casting the debates as being
about civil liberty issues such as freedom of religion or separation
See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Feminism, Women's Human Rights and Cultural
PHILOSOPHY FOR A MULTICULTURAL,
THE CENTER:
POSTCOLONIAL, AND FEMINIST WORLD 26 (Uma Narayan & Sandra Harding eds., 2000). In
11

Difference, in DECENTERING

her article, Okin seems not to appreciate that the women in the third world who are the
subjects of her concern are also participants in culture and religion not just victims of it. She
notes that there are feminists who are working on oppression but they are rarely internal to the
society when they are their work is only seen as resistance to, but never participation in,
culture or religion. See id. at 40-41.
12 See, e.g., supra note 6.
13 Madhavi Sunder, Piercingthe Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399, 1402-05 (2003).
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issues, that is, the separation of religion from the public/state, the
fiction that religion's place is in the private or indeed that it keeps to
such a private sphere is similarly maintained. I agree with Sunder that
limiting one's view in this manner prevents one from understanding
the importance of religion in the everyday public life of those living in
non-liberal societies.'
Liberalism cannot do the work of explaining why women value
religion except through judgments about these women as being either
ignorant or having a sense of false consciousness. 15 Neither of these is
appealing from the point of view of many Muslim women. After
centuries of interaction with the "West" and the ongoing attempts to
reform "developing" societies into liberal ones, the tenaciousness of
religion must be quite a puzzle. I suggest that in order to fully
understand why women value religion, one must set aside liberal
judgments. Muslim women's priorities and their commitments to
religion ought to be considered seriously and not simply as a premodem remnant that will eventually fall away or be relegated to a
private sphere. This is important because the reality of women's lives
in Islamic societies indicates that no such development is occurring
and in fact a rise in religiosity, as Olivier Roy arg6es, is a result of
modernity and not at all a vestige of pre-modernity.
Roy's point is underscored by a survey of Muslim women done in
2005 by The Gallup Organization. The survey revealed that Muslim
women did not view themselves as particularly oppressed, that they
did not feel conditioned to accept second-class status evidenced by the
belief that they ought to have an unfettered right to vote, to work
17
outside the home and to serve in the highest levels of government.
Yet, they also did not share typically liberal feminist concerns about
gender arrangements; they did not see sex issues as a priority and
placed violent extremism, economic and political corruption and lack
of unity among Muslim nations over concerns about the hijab, which
was never even mentioned by the respondents.18 When asked to
identify the best aspect of their own societies, an overwhelming
majority of women cited attachment to their spiritual and moral
14
15
16

Id. at 1402-04.
See generally Mehta, supra note 4.
See OLIVIER Roy, GLOBALIZED ISLAM:

THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH

148-97

(2004).
17 Dalia Mogahed, Perspectives of Women in the Muslim World, GALLUP WORLD POLL
SPECIAL REPORT: THE MUSLIM WORLD 1 (2006), available at http://media.gallup.com/

WorldPoll/PDF/GALLUP+MUSLIM+STUDIESPerspectives+of+WomenI 1.10.06_FINAL
.pdf.
18 Id. at3.
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values. 19 What is remarkable about this data is that women clearly
articulate the desire for certain (liberal?) rights while valuing their own
(non-liberal) religions and cultures.
Examples of this very "modem" hybrid sensibility can be found
among even rural women. In an interview published in Islamica
magazine, Mukhtar Mai, the now famous Pakistani survivor of a
tribally-sanctioned gang rape, repeatedly asserts the value of her
2°
religion and its role in providing the strength to stand up for justice.
She challenges the view that Islam supported the violence done to her
and discusses the way she was treated at the hands of the state. At the
same time, she levels a class critique of her treatment at the hands of
the state and it is clear that she considers herself to have the right to
21
Indeed, Islam is being contested but also lived in ways that
redress.
are more fluid and controversial than we see in most representations or
expectations.22 For instance, Muslim women in Egypt are divided in
their support for secularism and their adherence to Islamic norms. The
mosque movement in Egypt and the increasing number of women who
are attempting to learn about Islam and live its norms faithfully are
2
challenging and are challenged by domestic secular feminisms. 1 Yet
Islamic women's activism has taken root and is gaining ground, as
Margot Badran claims:
It is important to note that Islamic feminism is the creation of women and
men for whom religion is important in their daily lives and who are troubled

by inequalities and injustices perpetrated in the name of religion. Islamic
It is engaged and
feminism continues to spread because it is relevant.
24
enlightened. It is also controversial and unsettling.

19 Id. at 2.
20 Fareeha Khan, Interview with Mukhtaran Mai, 15 ISLAMICA MAGAZINE (2006),
available at http://www.is'lamicamagazine.com/issue- 15/interview-with-mukhtaran-mai.html.
21 See id.

22

See id.

23 See SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE FEMINIST
SUBJECT 2-6, 15-16 (2005).
24 Margot Badran, Islamic Feminism Revisited, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG, Feb. 10, 2006,
http://www.countercurrents.org/gen-badranlO0206.htm. While I would be wary of collapsing

all Muslim women's activism under the rubric of "feminism," which has historical and
philosophical particularities that may not translate to certain Muslim women's activism, this
quote can be read broadly to apply to all women's gender activism except perhaps those that
simply reinforce the dominant patriarchal norms. See also Elizabeth Warnock Femea, Islamic
Feminism Finds a Different Voice: The Muslim Women's Movement is Discovering its Roots
in Islam, Not in Imitating Western Feminists, 77 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 24, 29-31 (2000)
(arguing that by women giving Kornaic texts new interpretations, women are gaining greater
gender justice). But cf Val Moghadam, Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Notes on a
available at http://www.iran-bulletin.org/women/
Debate, MIDDLE EAST FORUM,
Islamic feminism IB.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2008) (arguing what has been achieved
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The fact that women continue to value religion and culture cannot
be reductively explained as a product of ignorance or brainwashing.25
These examples do not signify a simple story of oppression and
resistance or blind adherence to religion, but a complex reality in
which religion plays a much more multifaceted role, where it coexists
with the demand for rights that overlap with liberalism but may not
come from a liberal understanding of self or society. To acknowledge
this alternative view is not to say that Muslim women do not live in
systemic patriarchy, that Islam is not patriarchal, and that gender
subordination sometimes reflected in "traditional" arrangements ought
not to be challenged. Rather, it is to say that opinions about how it is
challenged, by whom, and what priorities are established can
legitimately differ among women and are mediated by local contexts.
It is also to acknowledge that Islam is not fixed and can be interpreted
in a number of ways and that religion must be engaged by feminists if
they seriously seek to support the full liberation and flourishing of
women in the Muslim world.26
III. REPRESENTING MUSLIM WOMEN: REAPING
ESTRANGEMENT FROM DISEMPOWERMENT
The co-presence of these seemingly conflicting commitments to
religion and to rights may tempt scholars to reconcile them through
liberal notions of progress towards modernity. Certainly, that has been
the dominant interpretation. However, to do so misapprehends the
project of women's groups in Islamic societies, which do not follow
such a linear temporal progression from religion to "liberty from
religion." Muslim women who want both the vote and the hijab do not
see a conflict between the two or the desire for the latter as less
"evolved." However, this double consciousness is little understood by
well-intentioned women's groups in the West.
Partnerships that are based on such different visions of women's
flourishing, then may lead to estrangement and disempowerment for
women's organization in the Muslim societies. Yet, Muslim women's
groups have themselves sometimes strategically deployed
constructions of victimization expected by liberals to garner much
needed support. In other words, Muslim women's organizations may
through the interpretation of Islamic texts is limited in content and consequence, because
interpretation of the texts is ultimately left to the ruling religious elites, which may dismiss the
feminist interpretations).
25

See MAHMOOD, supra note 23, at 1-2.

26

See Sunder, supra note 13, at 1433-34, 1456-57, 1463.
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cater to the expectation of victimization externally while internally
focusing on the strength of local women. This suggests that they do
not see themselves as victims but as agents in shaping their realities.
On the other hand, the exportation of a victim narrative can give rise to
a one-dimensional view on the part of Western partner organizations
that is then disseminated within Western societies. A case that
illustrates the pitfalls of such coalitional work based on differing views
of the "victim" would be the RAWA's experience with the FMF.
While both sides came together in good faith, their interaction
highlights the difficulties that attend transnational projects.
RAWA has become very well known in the recent decade for its
work to advance women's rights and in bringing attention to the
atrocities committed by the warring factions in Afghanistan. During
the 1980s, RAWA's main strategy to gain global support for its
projects was disseminating visual representations of the oppression of
Afghan women. 7 These images were exported to the world, printed
in newspapers and shown on television, as part of a campaign to raise
awareness and get monetary support. While it is clear that Afghan
women were indeed living under brutal conditions, these
representations standing alone deeply reinscribed the prevailing
stereotype of powerlessness and victimization that the world had come
to accept about most Muslim women. The strategy worked because it
shocked most viewers and gave first world feminists a transnational
cause with a palpable urgency to support.
While RAWA exported an account of oppression externally, its
internal strategy was markedly different. They published a newsletter
Payam-e-Zan that contained editorials and commentary and
inspirational materials encouraging women to redress their own
problems. RAWA built schools and hospitals and instituted social
programs combating fundamentalism even as they were pushed to the
borders of Pakistan during a decade of increasing violence within the
state. Thus, on one hand, RAWA was attempting to help women in
Afghanistan through reinforcing a self-perception of empowerment
and self-help, a self-perception that RAWA shared as an organization.
While on the other hand, the external picture that brought them
the West was one of abject powerlessness and brutal
support from
28
oppression.
27

See Amy Farrell & Patrice McDermott, Claiming Afghan Women: The Challenge of

Human Rights Discoursefor TransnationalFeminism, in JUST ADVOCACY? WOMEN'S HUMAN
RIGHTS, TRANSNATIONAL

FEMINISMS,

AND

THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION

(Wendy S. Hesford & Wendy Kozol eds., 2005).
28 See id. at 39-40.

33, 37-39
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In 1997, RAWA partnered with the FMF in its Campaign to End
Gender Apartheid. This was seen as a positive development by
RAWA. Undoubtedly, it benefited FMF and the women's movement
in the United States; some scholars have suggested that such a project
reinvigorated the lagging support for feminist organizations by
domestic women. Part of the reason for that decrease in domestic
support is the achievement of substantial legal and social victories for
feminists leading to greater access to education and the workplace and,
therefore, greater economic freedom. There was no urgency to the
other battles being fought in the United States, but helpless "sisters" in
other countries were languishing in their cultural prisons. Where that
prison became a torture chamber like in Afghanistan, domestic United
States feminists quickly mobilized on their behalf, just as many citizens
mobilize around disasters. Unfortunately, FMF's own representations
of Afghan women soon put them at odds with RAWA. FMF used the
same strategy of showing powerlessness and oppression to gain public
support but without adequately recognizing or acknowledging the long
and hard-fought struggle that RAWA had engaged in, which presented
quite the opposite picture.29
For instance, the shocking video clip of the burqa clad woman
being executed that was filmed by RAWA in the late 1990s, but did
not appear in Western media until after 9/11, was shown over and over
again to underscore the helplessness of Afghan women. Sonia
Kolhatkar, the vice president of the Afghan Women's Mission,
underscores this point:
Far more interested in portraying Afghan women as mute creatures covered
from head to toe, the Feminist Majority aggressively promotes itself and it's
[sic] campaign by selling small squares of mesh cloth, similar to the mesh
through which Afghan women can look outside when wearing the
traditional Afghan burqa. The post card on which the swatch of mesh is
sold says, "Wear a symbol of remembrance for Afghan women," as if they
are already extinct. An alternative could have been "Celebrate the
Resistance of Afghan Women" with a pin of a hand folded into a fist, to
acknowledge the very real struggle that Afghan women wage every day,
particularly the women of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of
Afghanistan (RAWA), who are at the forefront of that struggle.
Interestingly enough, 50% of all proceeds go toward helping Feminist
Majority in promoting their campaign on "Gender Apartheid" in
Afghanistan.
On almost every image of Afghan women in the Western mainstream and
even alternative media, images of shapeless blue clad forms of Afghan
29
(2004).
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women covered with the burqa . . . We all know and understand the
reactions which the image of the burqa brings, particularly to Western
women and feminists. That horror mixed with fear and ugly fascination like
knowing the site of a bloody car wreck will make you want to retch but you
do it anyway. Whose purpose does this serve? How "effective" would the
Feminist Majority's campaign be if they made it known that Afghan women
back and simply needed money and moral support,
were actively fighting
30
not instructions?

In a letter to Ms. Magazine, RAWA challenged FMF's
representation of Afghan women and accused it of being a hegemonic,
corporate feminist group that failed to acknowledge the twenty-five
years of work done by RAWA in Afghanistan and also to account for
Alliance that had actively
its support of groups like the Northern
31
power.
in
while
oppressed women
In substantial part, these images and this representation were coopted for political use. Indeed, just as RAWA's representations were
easily put to work to mobilize women in the United States, FMF's
advocacy and rhetoric did similar double duty by providing the Bush
administration a ready source of material to justify intervention in
Afghanistan. RAWA's accusation that FMF was a collaborator with
the administration was not altogether unjust: one of FMF's
achievements in its campaign was its involvement in shaping U.S.
foreign policy in Afghanistan and its acquiescence to the support for
the Northern Alliance by the administration. Although, the support of
a misogynistic political group and the involvement in foreign policy
by a partner organization angered RAWA, it is clear that RAWA's
chief resentment was the 32cooptation of its work and its authority to
represent Afghan women.
Both RAWA and FMF's representational strategies had undesired
and unintended consequences and resulted in their ultimate
estrangement. This interaction evidences the dangers that arise when
women's organizations from the West and South enter into a
partnership based on a very narrow understanding of women's agency
and women's flourishing. Clearly, RAWA exported the images that
were "expected" from a place like Afghanistan. To turn Kolhatkar's
question around: What would have happened had RAWA begun with
a campaign that highlighted the agency of Afghan women and clearly
stated that they only needed monetary support? By performing the
roles that liberalism assigned them, RAWA perhaps inadvertently
30

SEE KOLHATKAR, SUPRA NOTE 1.

31 See Farrell & McDermott, supra note 27, at 43.
32 See id. at 42-43.
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reinforced the narrative of progress. It is not surprising that FMF,
being a liberal feminist organization, strategically used the dominant
images of victimization of Afghan women as proof of the necessity to
reform the society. It is likely that RAWA's images provided the very
evidence needed by the telos of a society arranged according to liberal
values and was the only way to secure the liberation of millions of
otherwise oppressed women.
RAWA and FMF each spoke the language of women's human
rights but it seems as though neither fully comprehended each other's
aims. The bitter parting of ways that resulted did not lead FMF to
abandon its work on behalf of Afghan women. Rather, in the 1990s
and 2000s, women's groups including FMF began to work on a
number of transnational projects expanding their international scope.
One of the consequences of greater engagement in transnational work
was the engagement with the state and with international law as
partners in exporting progress.
IV. FEMINIST ALLIANCES WITH THE STATE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LIBERAL IMPERATIVE TO
PROGRESS AND THERAPEUTIC (COLONIAL) VIOLENCE
The FMF's alliance with RAWA was well intentioned, though
perhaps, ultimately it led to estrangement. Yet, the work that FMF
engaged in on the foreign policy level with the Bush administration
points to another set of troubling developments in Liberal Feminist
practice - partnering with Western state powers to achieve liberal
feminist ends internationally 33 and eroding the sovereignty of "rogue"

33 See Feminist.com, Talking Points for Your Call, http://www.feminist.con/
violence/campaign6.html (last visited October 7, 2008) for an explanation of talking points
that are given to volunteers urged to call their state representative in support of the
International Violence Against Women Act. The taking points were developed by Amnesty
International and disseminated by women's groups. Id.
TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR CALL
e The International Violence Against Women Act (I-VAWA) would coordinate and
improve U.S. government efforts to stop the global crisis of violence againstwomen andgirls,
if it becomes law.
e Violence against women destabilizes countries and impedes economic progress and
stability.
e Violence against women is a tremendous human rights problem around the world. It
includes rape, domestic violence, acid burning, dowry deaths, "honor killings," human
trafficking, female genital cutting and more. Experts estimate that up to one in three women
will be beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise abused in their lifetimes, with rates reaching 70
percent in some countries.
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states. 34 It is the latter which I am concerned with in this section
because it is most likely to be considered a welcomed change in the
international order.
Until recently, the obligations of International Human Rights law
and consequences of infractions devolved to governments. Individuals
and social organizations petitioned to their governments for redress
but had little standing in international institutions. Increasingly,
human rights instruments have begun to bypass state-level actors to
and individuals. 35
actors
non-governmental
internal
to
standing
give
The rationale for this development was the number of states in the
global South that either failed to protect their own citizens from abuses
or were actively engaged in abuse themselves. Such states could not
be relied on to report or comply with international legal obligations.
Thus, it was considered necessary to give voice to those who were
otherwise kept silent by their own states. Although, this sort of
standing has given expression to a number of constituencies that
would otherwise be at the mercy of their state, the erosion of state
sovereignty in favor of more internationalism comes with costs.

WA is designed to give victims of violence more assistance, hold perpetrators
I
]-VA
accountable, and support new efforts to change social norms that support or condone
violence.
o The legislation would create afive-year strategy andfunding to support the rule of law
and prevent and respond to violence against women in 10-20 poor to middle income
countries. It will expand the U.S. Government's ability to address gender-based violence
issues with foreign governments as part of its diplomatic relations.
o I-VAWA integrates efforts to end violence against women and girls into existing,
appropriate U.S. foreign assistance programs with a special emphasis on supporting the
overseas women's groups that work each day to stop violence.
o I-VAWA enables the U.S. Government to develop afaster and more effective response
to violence against women in armed conflicts and humanitarianemergencies.
* Passing I-AWA is essential if the U.S. is to take a more coordinated and effective
stand against violence that harms so many women and girls worldwide and will help support
economic progress and stability in 10-20 poor and middle income countries. Id. (emphasis
added).
The emphasis here is clearly to enable the U.S. to take action on a state level to improve
the lives of women in "10-20 poor to middle income countries." Id. This raises the question
of what the purported "beneficiaries" of the country feel about the U.S. government's actions
and the linking of foreign assistance to progress.
34 See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REv. 741 (2007)
(describing the use of state police power to "crack down" on domestic violence perpetrators
and the resulting adverse consequences born largely by the women who are their partners,
including homelessness and financial immiseration).
35 See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15,
1999).
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First, armed with the ability to access the international arena for
themselves and using the language of human rights, second-wave
feminists in both the West and the South have tried to get societies that
they consider particularly oppressive towards women further along in
the progress towards "freedom. 36 In that effort, they have partnered
with organizations in the global South. As has been argued above,
what women's groups believe to be progress in the first world and
what it is considered to be in the third world may not be equivalent.
Aside from the basic agreements that violence against women is a bad
thing, that certain rights are required for human life and dignity to be
preserved, it is unclear that all constituencies agree about what initially
causes the conditions in which violence occurs in a society (Western
feminists often cite "culture") or what the society ought to look like at
the end of "progress."
If we continue to promote progress along the liberal trajectory, it is
quite clear that we may be supporting the end/annihilation/extinction
of certain ways of life that might enrich those who live them. For
some, the end of Islam, the end of any culture that does not abide by
the values of liberalism, is no great loss. These illiberal religions and
cultures may be "reformed" or made extinct through "forced" progress
if necessary. Yet, for many women who live communal lives, made
meaningful by their culture and its values, this progress cuts against
their own visions of progress.
Second, a commitment to international human rights has evolved
into an emerging consensus that human rights violations are grounds for
military intervention. Progress through humanitarian intervention has
been supported by some liberal feminists who question why such
intervention has not come sooner. 37 Indeed, humanitarian armed
intervention is increasingly seen as a necessity and not a last measure
for preventing violence towards women and children; however, the
devastating therapeutic violence of intervention itself is obscured and
decoupled from human rights activism on behalf of third-world
women. While liberal feminists largely rejected the administration's
justifications for the Iraq war, they have been vociferous about
intervention in Darfur. It is an odd contradiction that armed
intervention that overthrows a despot in one country is decried for
causing chaos and violence while similar actions are encouraged in
another as a solution to chaos and violence. It might be argued that
36

See Feminist.com, supra note 32.
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peacekeepers can hardly be equated with an invading army. This is
true, but it should be noted that the U.S. military in Iraq is hardly
fighting the conventional war of invasion and peacekeepers attempting
to settle conflict may be drawn into warfare, as the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia evidences. 38 Further, there is other violence that
attend intervention. In recent reports, peacekeepers deployed to wartorn areas have come under scrutiny for sexual exploitation and abuse
of women and children under their care. 3 9 This is not to say that
intervention is always, necessarily wrong and that it should never be
undertaken on behalf of those who stand to lose their lives. I can
make no such categorical judgments. However, I do suggest that the
costs of intervention borne by the people that are supposed to be
helped by it require greater examination.
One part of that examination must include the complicity of
Western states in a global system that exempt themselves from the
consequences of violating international law; that support violence in
the South; and prop up regimes that are illegitimate in the eyes of their
subjects. Indeed, as Zillah Eisenstein observes, "[m]any Afghan
women activists wonder why U.S. women, even progressive ones...
are more interested in 'why Afghan men treat women like dirt' rather
'misogynist
than why Western male-dominated governments foster
40
rights."
women's
of
expense
the
at
extremism
religious
First world states' willingness to use force in any guise is a
dangerous development for women from the global South who stand
to lose their lives, their children, their brothers and sisters, their
mothers and fathers, and their husbands and loved ones in wars and
detention camps for what might be a fantasy vision of freedom. That
first world women are willing to collaborate with the very "patriarchy"
that they claim to be oppressed by, deploy its weapons, and while
decrying the cooptation of women's rights rhetoric ought to be
regarded as an inconsistency that demands redress.
As Amy Farrell and Patrice McDermott argue:
Whenever Americans position themselves as saviors, their rhetorical
devices can then be wielded by conservative forces to legitimate whatever
kind of horrific policies they choose to enact, particularly when those
38 See Michael H. Hoffman, Peace-Enforcement Actions and Humanitarian Law:
Emerging Rules for "InterventionalArmed Conflict," 837 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 193 (2000), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmi57JQCY.
39 See Peacekeepers Abusing Children, BBC, May 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/7420798.stm; Peacekeepers Sell Arms to Somalis, BBC, May 23, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7417435.stm.
40 See EIsENSTEIN, supranote 29, at 166.
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policies are wielded against Arab and African countries which we "know"
to be backward because we have been working to liberate them. These are
powerful discursive quandaries that progressive feminist organizations in
the United States face, even if their intentions are good, and even if they are
4'
run by Third World or Muslim women.

Rather than continuing to mouth hollow pieties about "women's
rights as human rights," it is imperative now more than ever for first
world feminists to critically theorize the local and discover how their
own agendas have been used to further what can only be considered
imperial power dynamics in the international sphere. I suggest that
liberal feminists think particularly carefully about the calls for use of
international intervention to further women's human rights, decoupled
from local contexts and understood as liberal rights. Such uses of
power as a means of progress resuscitate a colonial dynamic that is
fraught with the peril of subjugation and violence towards the very
people it seeks to liberate.
Instead, more support for local practices of human rights and
liberation that are being engaged in by ordinary Muslim women and
men in the global South in general might be a better way to improve
lives, even if we disagree with their definitions of liberation and
human flourishing. This would require us to accept these women as
fully capable humans and their commitments to their religion and
culture as valid expressions of "freedom." Critical approaches that
find agency in various locations and understand power to be exercised
even by those who have traditionally been considered powerless gives
us one avenue to do this kind of revising and expanding of our
understanding of Muslim women.
The ultimate goal for such acceptance and contextualization is to
prevent the narrative of progress from dictating a course of action that
"pressures" illiberal societies towards liberal arrangements because
that is what "we" want. Further, it calls us to take care that the
''pressure" that is exerted on behalf of women's rights does not include
therapeutic violence. This is not to say that intervention will never be
justified or required; it is to merely warn that intervention in the
service of Liberal progress ought to be regarded as the first step in a
resurgence of the tutelary relationship that characterized colonialism.

41
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CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE FUTURE ALLIANCES

Liberal (legal) feminism as a theoretical enterprise suffers from a
dubious past insofar as it encompasses and pursues progress along the
lines of its liberal ancestors. Its future depends upon whether it will
continue to support the same agenda along a predetermined trajectory
that will lead all women to a singular end. This view admits only a
singular progression in history in which the worlds of many
underdeveloped dystopias have yet to arrive at the Promised Land. On
the other hand, it can theorize a new vision that does not require such a
judgment from the "outside." Indeed, whether it creates a space for
such alternative visions of flourishing, Muslim women and many
societies in the global South are living such alternatives. There is a
co-presence of all these competing views of what it means to live a
good life. If liberal feminists are to understand religious Muslim
women's activism that seeks both liberal and illiberal rights, this copresence has to be allowed to disrupt the meta-narrative of progress.
In other words, the predicament for liberal feminism, which is by selfdefinition a theory and praxis of liberation, is whether to reconcile
itself with its peculiarly anti-liberation genealogy which informs it
currently (affirm liberal universalism) or radically reevaluate this
ancestry to try and reformulate itself in a way that reflects a true
liberation theory and praxis (takes a break from liberalism).4 2
If liberal feminists were able to take such a break, at least from
universalizing their values and goals, they might be rewarded with a
greater comprehension of the motivations and values of Muslim
women who insist on holding on to their religion and culture while
demanding rights. As I have argued above, Muslims do indeed have
similar desires but that these desires for a better life, for those who
believe, include their commitment and adherence to religion and
represent a very different view of human flourishing. Rather than
reforming these alternative histories and visions, an approach that
accepts this plurality would find a valuable and meaningful expression
of human progress and liberation and impose or require no "reform,"
except those undertaken voluntarily.
While I think it unnecessary to abandon second-wave feminism's
many contributions, including the understanding that women in every
culture live in a gender unequal system, critical theorists can give us a
more nuanced approach that reveals how even within that system,
42
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women can maneuver and exert power and make choices. It can also
give us the ability to recognize similar projects undertaken by women
living in Muslim societies but not mistake these as projects that are the
same as our own undertaken in our contexts. Moreover, it can make
obvious the complex and contested nature of the global system
particularly the role of economic disparity and increasingly
environmental disparity and the way in which privileged women wield
power - sometimes to the benefit and sometimes to the detriment of
other women. Most importantly, it can underscore how the inequality
in the global system cannot be ignored when engaging state power
internationally or engaging international institutions for seemingly
benevolent purposes.
Such critical contributions are becoming
increasingly important as women seek to do transnational work in
alliances with organizations across the globe. Without taking into
account both the differing values of women in these locations and the
nature of the international system, alliances between first and third
world women may never be made on grounds that seek what is best
for women in their local context and with respect to alternative visions
of human flourishing.
They will continue to suffer from the
hegemonic, imperialistic tendencies that are part of the history and
philosophy of liberalism. It is a sign of hope, then, that some strains
of feminists are interrogating these tendencies and reinventing a more
equal gender liberation theory.

